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ORGANIZED CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY IN THE EU 
 
Justin Greenwood∗ 
 
Abstract 
 
Structural limitations in models of representative democracy have enhanced the space for other 
mechanisms of legitimacy in the European Union, including participatory models in which 
organized civil society interests are significant players. To some observers, such actors are likely 
only to aggravate already problematic input legitimacy. A range of less hostile approaches also 
prevail, from a neutral standpoint through to those sharing the perspective of EU policy practice 
where such actors are seen as a complementary mechanism of democratic input. Whilst 
concerns about the impact of asymmetries of power between different types of organised civil 
society interests arise as potential issues in any democratic setting, a particularly vigorous neo-
pluralist regime in which EU institutions actively create and develop as well as empower citizen 
interest groups effectively mitigate these asymmetries in an EU context, although can give rise to 
paradoxical tensions of elitism.   
 
Declining public confidence in the traditional institutions of representative democracy, together 
with increasing public participation in alternative forms of political action, are key among features 
of what some observers have described as ‘the most fundamental transformation of the 
democratic process since the creation of mass democracy in the early twentieth century.’1  The 
decline of deference, open government, the geographical spread of the ‘democratic tide’2, and the 
growth of transnational authority systems and politics, are further notable features of this wider 
transformation. The European Union is both an agent of, and subject to, this process.  As an 
agent, some of its features amount to no less than an experiment in democratic processes.  As a 
subject, the expanding role and functions of the EU and its potential impact in weakening national 
political control have driven demands for it to acquire the core attributes of political control and 
political equality central to democratic governance3. This dualism is reflected in the somewhat 
dramatic summation of Katz, that ‘the EU represents both the greatest hope and the greatest 
danger to democracy in Europe at the beginning of the 21st century’4. To what extent are 
organized civil society interests friends or foe of democracy in this transformation process?  Can 
the emphasis placed upon them in ‘hopeful’ accounts as surrogates for faults in representative 
democracy be justified?  Is there anything creative to be drawn from their contribution to the 
development of EU democratic legitimacy?   
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EU Boundaries of Representative Democracy: room for other models? 
 
The institutional arrangements and practices of the EU fail to conform to any one conception of 
democracy. Katz reflects orthodoxy in holding that the idealized model of popular sovereignty 
implemented through party government, drawn from parliamentary democracy at the national 
level, is unrealistic at the EU level5.  This is because of the absence of the full apparatus and 
usual features of representative democracy, such as EU wide political parties, adversarial parties 
competing for office, elections which could change a government, a limited extent of budgetary 
and legislative reach over which the European Parliament has scrutiny, and only indirect 
structures of accountability for the Council of Ministers and European Council.  Further traditional 
mechanisms which might otherwise bring a ‘European wide public space’, such as an EU wide 
media, are also absent.  In consequence, the basic requirement of a widely intelligible decision 
making system6, or mechanisms to ‘transform complicated issues into distinguishable alternatives 
for decision along clearly defined conflict lines’7 appear lacking.  Of interest is that additional fault-
lines which are frequently mentioned bear a resemblance to those typically listed in some 
emerging democracies, including over- strong executive power, policy making which is elite 
dominated, and structural weaknesses among political party and civil society representative 
systems8.  
 
The absence of a ‘European wide public space’ contributes towards an alternative focus of 
institutional politics centred on finding agreements reached within and between multiple 
institutional actors, on unsure foundations of shifting issue majorities, and is therefore likely to be 
oriented towards consensus seeking.  When these institutional actors are relatively open, so there 
is an enhanced space for organised civil society actors to contribute to policy-making, and a 
potential means to seek to legitimise political decisions reached.  To onlookers, the result is a 
relatively inward looking system populated by elites.  The diffusion of power also enhances the 
ability of a wide variety of organised civil society players to draw something of desire from policy-
making, with few outright ‘winners’ and ‘losers’.  Majoritarian politics are only legitimate in the 
context of a homogenous society9 with ‘we-feeling’10, where there are process provisions for the 
protection of minorities.  Democracy is thus linked to social conditions which cannot be created 
artificially by constitutional acts11. In this perspective, a core, and enduring, problem for the EU is 
one of legitimacy in the form of a lack of acceptance from nationals of one country that 
representatives of citizens of other countries have a formal share in their rule12, and which no 
amount of tinkering with representative institutions can resolve13. Another is the sheer territorial 
scale of the EU14. A more democratic EU involving the institutionalisation of a set of procedures 
guaranteeing the ability of the governed to participate in the adoption of collectively binding 
decision would not therefore necessarily lead to an increase in its legitimacy, here meaning 
popular consent to governance by collectively binding decisions.15  In similar vein, using a key 
distinction between types of legitimacy drawn from Easton’s political system model16, Scharpf 
holds that the democratisation of European institutions is unlikely to increase the input-oriented 
legitimacy of decisions taken by majority rule17. He defines this type of legitimacy as meaning ‘that 
political choices should be derived, directly or indirectly, from the authentic preferences of 
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citizens’18, distinguishing it from legitimacy deriving from outputs, popularly interpreted as ‘winning 
by results.’  Here, ‘deriving...from’ seem to be key terms, allowing for processes which ensure the 
protection of minorities among the authentic preferences of citizens, and providing some degree 
of utility to the ‘input’ formula. 
 
Despite the widely held orthodoxy outlined by Katz, some underlying tendencies have led to the 
adoption of more qualified positions.  Some authors reserve their position as to future 
developments by noting that a series of ‘institutional reforms of the legislative process have 
altered the EU in the direction of a representative democracy’19 (my emphasis).  To these 
authors, if popular input and control over EU policy making are further institutionalized, then the 
preferences of the EU electorate will become significant.  If central features of liberal democracy 
include subjecting the state to public accountability and societal control, the development of 
measures aimed at achieving these pillars are clearly evident. There is little doubt that a range of 
measures concerned with facilitating accountability, such as transparency and access to 
documentation, do attempt to put the recognisable supporting infrastructure of popular control in 
place, even if the main apparatus of representative democracy is deficient.  New European 
Council provisions requiring the Council of the European Union to meet in public when it 
considers legislation will, once implemented, enhance the ability of national parliaments to hold 
their national representatives accountable.  Seen in this way, the incremental addition of 
measures linking direct with the citizen aimed at institutionalising and investing popular control 
through the creation of institutionalized checks have a progressive, developmental feel about 
them.  Some of these measures, such as access to documents, inevitably depend upon elite 
specialists, such as organised civil society, with the resources and know-how to operationalise 
them and bring the potential benefits of placing information in the public domain, to wider civil 
society. 
 
Added to these perspectives is empirical research which suggests that citizens see EU politics 
through familiar conceptual lenses they use to interpret politics at the national level, simplifying 
the complexities of EU politics in ways that make sense to them20.  Whilst the development of a 
fully recognisable European party system seems distant, an institutionalized EU party funding 
system has begun to emerge.  The concept of representative democracy in which citizens are 
mobilized by parties according to their identifications, interests and ideological sympathies may in 
any event reflect ‘a lament for a lost world of national politics’21.  Nonetheless, Gabel and Hix 
show how EU political parties are not just arbitrary groupings of national parties or empty vessels.  
Rather, they do influence the behaviour of their members and shape the agenda of EU politics, 
and consist of parties with similar constituencies and ideological /policy concerns22.  Familiar 
left/right cleavages found at the national level, carried across to political party organisations in the 
European Parliament, is a major factor in structuring political behaviour towards issues in EU 
politics23.  Similarly, recognisable alliances found between political parties and interest groups at 
the national level work in a very similar way at the EU level.  Thus, industry is aligned with 
conservative/Christian democratic/liberal parties, unions with labour parties, and an ‘alliance of 
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the weak’ drawing together environmental and consumer organisations with green and nationalist 
parties at the EU level24.   
 
The presence of some of the familiar supporting infrastructure of representative democracy is 
some justification for its pre-eminent position in the 2004 Treaty establishing a Constitution for 
Europe.  Article 46 is titled ‘The principle of representative democracy’, the first clause of which 
unequivocally proclaims that ‘The working of the Union shall be founded on the principle of 
representative democracy.’  The second clause notes that citizens are directly represented at EU 
level in the European Parliament, providing for an indirect mechanism of representation in that 
Member States in the European Council and the Council of Ministers are accountable to national 
parliaments, elected by their citizens.  Through these mechanisms is embraced, under the third 
clause, the right of every citizen to participate in the democratic life of the EU.  Participation 
outside of formal representative apparatus is covered by a separate Article 47 on ‘participatory 
democracy’, in which the secondary role of such mechanisms is enshrined.   One of its clauses 
codifies current practice in stating that ‘the institutions shall maintain an open, transparent and 
regular dialogue with representative associations and civil society.’25 This priority order seeks to 
limit the potential for any clash between the two traditions, in the aspiration that measures for 
participatory democracy can continue to develop without offending the mainstay principle of 
representative democracy.  Whilst the rather unsure foundations of the European Parliament is 
partly reflected by its need to recently assert that ‘consultation of interested parties with the aim of 
improving draft legislation can only ever supplement and can never replace the procedures and 
decisions of legislative bodies which possess democratic legitimacy; only the Council and 
Parliament, as co-legislators, can take responsible decisions in the context of legislative 
procedures26, this does clearly state the position now enshrined in the Constitutional Treaty. 
 
The 1997 Amsterdam Treaty articulated democratic foundation principles of liberty, democracy, 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law27.  In its de jure design, 
the EU seems to fulfil some, if not most, of the basic criteria for liberal democracy.  Thus, there 
are: individual rights enabling democratic participation; the institutional separation of powers; an 
institutionalized system of checks and balances; a representative assembly with most of the usual 
powers; a growing reach of transparency mechanisms to enable the exercise of these various 
powers; and powers which are limited in their reach by design28.  Structural deficiencies there 
may be, but so too are there (and likely always will be) with every liberal democracy with even 
core democratic standards29, and at least in institutional design terms the EU is comparable to 
standards to be found in the United States30.  The multi-governance nature of the EU may even 
put it in an advantageous position from the point of view of institutionalized checks and balances 
in the system31, which can also insulate the EU from being routinely dominated by special 
interests32. However, few would claim that this is a sufficient basis for legitimacy, and, while all 
advanced democracies have work to do in addressing evident popular confidence problems, the 
EU has more than most to do.  The relative youth together with the sui generis nature of the EU, 
may however give it a better excuse than most for a legitimacy deficit, and contributors to the 
debate can draw satisfaction from a sense of contributing to an early canvas of development.  
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 Whilst the absence of anything equivalent to the voting mechanism in representative democracy 
has always been a limiting factor for the institutional embrace of participatory democracy, several 
of the brush strokes applied to the emerging canvas draw from this latter tradition.   Armstrong, 
however, sees little progress in the constitutional ranking of democratic principles: ‘If, however, 
we are to give civil society a significant role as a new front in the democratic legitimation of EU 
governance we need to develop a more sophisticated analysis than that offered by the idea of a 
participatory democracy subservient to a standard model of representative democracy’33.  This 
somewhat ungenerous treatment fails to offer an alternative, and in doing so leaves unexplored 
an open question as to whether the contrast between representation by political parties, and 
participation by civil society groups, is drawn too strictly. 
 
The absence of a fully functioning recognisable democratic representative system provides space 
for a participatory based model to flourish.  Whilst it is mature democracies which have 
substantial participatory systems alongside them, the tendency towards consensual, rather than 
majoritarian, politics in the EU contributes to a thriving ‘bargained politics’ model.  In such a 
bargaining model, organised interests are central players.  An old debate is whether such groups 
came in response to the development of EU competencies34 or pre-dated these35 and/or even 
helped to create them36. The substantial institutional incentives for their participation, reviewed in 
later sections, lend credence to each of these interpretations, but the empirical evidence is most 
strongly supportive of groups responding to EU competencies37. Apart from these incentives, the 
principal activities to which citizen groups have responded have been attempts to equip the EU 
with avenues of democratic legitimacy since the Treaty on European Union.  Once established, 
groups have become the source of further demands for participation, indicating a more general 
mechanism in which the supply of opportunities for participation influences demand for them.  
This mechanism was foreseen in early accounts of the integration process, in which an agent 
provocateur Commission stimulates the emergence of EU level interest groups as demand 
agents of European integration and aspires for them roles as agents of popular legitimacy.38  An 
enrichment to this account is derivative from the work of Lindblom (1977), in which an activist 
bureaucracy develops procedures to empower citizen interest group participation.39  In Lindblom’s 
version the purpose of this is help resolve asymmetries of power, but the activities of the 
Commission in directly creating, and nurturing, groups extend someway beyond this, and suggest 
extensive aspirations for the role of organised civil society in the development of the EU.  
 
Three Approaches to Organized Interests and EU Democratic Legitimacy 
 
Three approaches to the contribution of organized interests to EU democratic legitimacy can be 
distinguished: deeply reserved or hostile; neutral; and optimistic.  The first set of authors’ view this 
contribution as problematic in two ways.  The first of these is a general hostility to factionalism, 
evident from the work of Rousseau’s Social Contract, on the grounds that governments have a 
wider duty to the general interest.  A second is the way in which political outcomes arising from 
bargaining between elites is seen as inherently problematic for wider input legitimacy40.  This 
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latter type of summation can be found among a recent collection on informal governance in the 
EU, where questions are raised as to whether informal networks are sufficiently accountable to 
remain legitimate over the course of time41.  A number of contributors to this volume42 argue that 
while the participation of organized civil society to EU governance may contribute to decision 
making efficiency and to output (effectiveness) legitimacy, its elite nature makes it a threat to 
input legitimacy.  Further, these chapters argue that output legitimacy has little contribution to 
make to the popular legitimacy of the EU.  In a retort to the work of Majone43 and Moravcsik44, 
reviewed below, Wincott argues that ‘while many scholars still regard the EU as effectively 
legitimized by efficiency-oriented functional ‘outputs’, this ‘once upon a time’ story now has a 
‘fairy-tale’ quality’45. 
 
A further dimension is added by authors who see attempts to enhance input legitimacy as likely to 
interfere with output legitimacy.  This may happen either by clogging up decision making 
systems46, or by the negative externalities of bargaining and coalition building such as the 
restriction of trade, and/or outcomes which are suboptimal, inefficient, and unworkable47. Whilst 
factionalism may provide a pluralist type outlet for the diversity of civil society, in the ‘hostile’ 
interpretation citizen groups fail to take into account broader perspectives required of democratic 
processes, using wider agendas of ‘democratic deficit’ to demand attention to relatively narrow 
issues and a stake for elites who may have little connection with wider constituencies. Despite 
awareness of such possibilities, Skogstad takes the more benign view of what she terms ‘network 
governance’ as a means to enhance legitimacy that arises from the presence of procedures to 
enable participation48.  On the other hand, Christiansen and Piattoni themselves take a more 
qualified view, in that ‘informal governance may be crucial for finding creative Pareto improving 
solutions, but it is not obvious that informal arrangements are well suited for contested distributive 
decisions’49. 
 
This view of the problematic nature of distributive, and particularly re-distributive, policy making 
for EU legitimacy is shared by Majone, who advises a restrictive EU regime limited to regulatory 
politics on the grounds that the EU never can acquire sufficient legitimacy to engage in re-
distribution.  Because regulatory agencies have more limited requirements for legitimacy than do 
re-distributive polities due to the technical functions they undertake, a focus upon legitimacy 
based primarily upon outputs may suffice50.  Scharpf51 shares both a general scepticism of the 
possibilities of achieving a broader type of EU input legitimacy, and Majone’s emphasis upon 
output legitimacy.  This general model resonates with an older distinction between legitimacy 
based upon either consent (from Locke) or benefit (from Hume)52.  Examples of output measures 
oriented at legitimacy include environmental and consumer protection policies, and one proposal 
to arise in the preliminary work programme preceding the 2001 White Paper on Governance was 
to deliberately concentrate regulatory activity in such fields as part of a quest for popular 
legitimacy53.  Majone’s model does allow for policy input from groups, although it carries echoes 
of negative externalities in warning that regulatory agencies formulating policy primarily on a 
technical basis need to be insulated from popular pressures which deviate from this.  Whilst 
Majone’s model is based upon David Easton’s ‘input-output’ model of politics to EU legitimacy, it 
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is worth recording that Lipset, and Easton himself, saw outputs as an insufficient basis for a 
stable political system54.   
 
From the perspective in which output legitimacy is the main focus, the view of the contribution 
which organized interests make to the EU political system tends to be positive.  This is because of 
the expert resources which such players bring to assist EU institutions in policy making, 
implementation and monitoring. The general Majone thesis seems to be strengthened by the 
viewpoint about the negligible sum contribution such actors might make to input legitimacy.  This 
scepticism is articulated most explicitly by Scharpf, who argues that ‘it is hard to see how informal 
networks of interest intermediation and anonymous expert committees could be considered 
satisfactory substitutes for the democratic accountability of representatives whose mandate is 
derived, directly or indirectly, from general elections based on the formal equality of all citizens’55.  
As Scharpf takes no position as to the question of whether such interests could actually be 
damaging to wider input legitimacy, his is the ‘neutral’ view.  Elsewhere, he does note with 
approval the way in which ‘bargaining’ does at least force actors to take a variety of other views 
into account, placing him on the ‘positive’ side of neutral56.   
 
A qualitatively different perspective is provided by those who see organized interests as having a 
contribution to make to input legitimacy as a complementary structure to outlets of representative 
democracy.  In this eclectic model, organized civil society interests make a partial contribution to 
compensating for the structural deficiencies of traditional representative democratic models 
applied to the EU.  Such an approach is a familiar one on the general role of organized interests 
in pluralist democratic concepts.  Classic contributions span the recent heritage of authors such 
as Dahl57, to deeper roots drawing on the classical traditions of Alexis de Tocqueville58 and 
Madison59.  These writers provide perspectives on the importance of interest groups to 
democracy through checks and balances, as schools of democracy, or in the broader sense of 
civil participation as a foundation of mass democracy. The EU is built upon pluralist foundations of 
checks and balances, with institutional designs to empower interest groups as guardian of the 
public interest by checking the power of public institutions, reviewed earlier, and upon each other, 
with very deliberate attempts by the Commission to nurture the landscape and power of citizen 
interest groups.  As is reviewed later, these are supported by funding and by policy initiatives such 
as open access and transparency to enable actors to observe the actions of each other.  There is 
a tradition which sees them as potential agents of deliberation, reviewed below. It is however 
much more difficult to make a case for the role of organised civil society interests in fostering 
mass democracy given the highly institutionalised basis of EU policy-making which incentivises 
elite bargaining, and the difficulties of mobilising disparate and disengaged stakeholders.  
 
Substantial shades are evident about the ways in which participation by outlets of organized civil 
society co-exist with representative democracy. These range from those following the tradition of 
Rokkan60 and Offe61 who tolerate the involvement of civil society participation provided it does not 
come at the expense of parliamentary deliberation62 to those who stress particular types of 
benefits, through to those with a generally positive outlook.  Those who stress particular types of 
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benefits at the EU level include Magnette63, who follows Kant in stressing how all citizens benefit 
from the mobilisation & vigilance of more active ones, and Curtin64, who sees digital access to 
information as the means to achieve more participation.  Vibert follows the Madisonian focus on 
checks and balances in seeing EU organized interests as checks on the authority and reach of 
the state, following Smith and Hume in seeing them as agents for the maintenance of a private 
sphere autonomous from the state65.  In playing such a role, there are however limits on the 
extent to which groups can participate in state structures, and these outlooks share a view of the 
limited role such actors can take.  Among the less reserved positions on the potential role of EU 
organized interests to input legitimacy are those by Héritier66, Wessels67, Schmitter68, Lord and 
Beetham69, and Smismans70.  Of these, Schmitter’s is by a distance the most prescriptive in 
advocating the establishment of a semi-public status for associations, the financing of them via 
compulsory contributions, and the distribution of funds via citizen vouchers.  This account has 
proved somewhat beyond even the most radical thinkers in the European Commission’s Forward 
Studies Unit.  Héritier’s is the most analytically optimistic in seeing the participation of interest 
groups in the EU policy process as a substitute for other forms of democratic legitimation, and 
because ‘bargaining democracy creates input legitimation since it prevents individual interests 
from being outvoted and thereby forces actors to take multiple interests into account’71.  In this 
sense, organised civil society provides some degree of legitimacy for political decisions on the 
basis of their participation.  Heritier’s position is also similar to Grande’s position in focusing on 
how the dispersal of power to multiple levels in the EU system has pluralistic effects, tending 
towards consensual outcomes when diverse stakeholders can find ease of access at different 
points in the decision making system and find something of their input in the character of political 
decisions reached.   
 
These three broad approaches to the role of organised civil society in EU democratic legitimacy – 
deeply reserved or hostile, neutral, and optimistic – can be examined further by confronting two 
features about organised civil society operating at the EU level and their associated features 
which seasoned observers as to the role of groups in political systems seem to find most 
distinctive about the EU.  These concern the high institutionalisation of organised civil society 
interests, and the confederal nature of most EU interest groups. 
 
The Institutionalisation of Organised Civil Society in the EU  
 
The most striking features of the institutionalisation of organised civil society interests in the EU 
are: the role of EU political institutions in interest group formation and maintenance, including 
substantial funding of non-business groups; the incorporation of selected groups in formal and 
informal political structures of EU political institutions; and the use of procedures to empower and 
enhance the role of groups.  Around 1500 (some guesstimates go to 250072) groups constituted 
in law organised at EU level embrace virtually every imaginable spectrum of civil society. 
 
The ways in which organised civil society has become the natural constituency of the European 
Commission as suppliers of expert resources, political agents of support for more EU powers, 
bellwethers of legislative chances, and potential agents of input legitimacy, make the Commission 
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the principal focus as an activist source of initiatives.  The Commission’s focus on interest groups 
as potential agents of input legitimacy historically developed in the time when the European 
Parliament was an assembly without popular election or extensive powers, when the traditional 
strengths of interest groups as checks and balances on both political institutions, and upon each 
other, could provide another contributory avenue of popular legitimation.  This helps explain the 
Commission’s activism in creating groups and facilitating group formation in and beyond the early 
stages of European integration, nurturing fledgling groups as necessary, and providing necessary 
open access to its work.  But the role of the Commission has been much more than the ‘neutral 
arbiter of the interest group game’ as it would be cast in classical pluralist accounts. Its active role 
in funding regimes for citizen interest groups, and in empowering citizen interest groups through 
policy initiatives since the Treaty on European Union and flowing from the landmark 2001 White 
Paper on Governance, suggests much more of the neo-pluralist type role cast by Lindblom73 in 
addressing asymmetries of power between different types of interests as a precondition for group 
participation in democratic architecture.   
 
The Commission’s clear view of the need to facilitate the formation of EU level groups at an early 
stage can be found in early accounts of the EU interest group process.  Sidjanski records the 
European Commission’s attempts to engage only with EU level groups,74 while a remaining 
preference for dialogue with EU groups can be found in a 1992 policy statement which remains 
prominent on Europa today.75  A general pattern of the Commission’s role in creating business 
interlocutors for output related purposes seems to emerge from accounts of domains such as 
retail76, and biotechnology.77.  Some groups have been created by the entrepreneurship of former 
Commission officials who saw a niche opportunity, including those representing the liberal 
professions, and the European Women’s Lobby.  But it is the Commission’s role in stimulating the 
emergence of citizen interest groups, and in funding and nurturing them, which really catches the 
eye of the observer.  The Commission spends around 1 per cent of the EU budget, around 
€1billion annually, in funding interest group activities.  Virtually every one of an estimated 
constituency of 300 citizen interest groups organised at EU level receives EU funding78.  Leading 
policy oriented citizen groups such as the European Network Against Racism, and the European 
Social Platform receive 80-90 per cent of their funding from the EU political institutions79.  Many of 
the thirty eight members of the Social Platform, embracing some of the largest and best known 
citizen interest groups working in a broadly defined social field, receive 60-90 per cent of their 
funding from EU political institutions80.  As an example of the ways in which active EU policies 
help address potential asymmetries of power between different constituencies of groups, EU 
funding assists the WorldWide Fund for Nature EU policy office Brussels, to reach staffing levels 
which exceed the average of an EU trade association by a multiple of seven.81   
 
Fresh observers, and some ‘outsider’ activist groups, might see such funding dependencies as 
evidence of over institutionalisation and a limit upon the input legitimacy potential of recipients.  
Citizen groups organised at EU level instead stress the way in which such funding is a means of 
independence much in the same way as state funding of political parties removes the need to 
seek alternative sources of funding which might otherwise create legitimacy threatening 
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dependencies.  A mark of the density of such funding is the speed at which ‘outsider’ groups 
critical of the EU become drawn to participation through network links to organisations which do 
receive EU funding, and by the Commission’s ‘open doors’ approach to dialogue of an institutional 
or informal kind, summarised later. 
 
EU funding issues arise through group formation as well as maintenance, where something of a 
pattern seems to arise.  Whilst the principal activist in group formation could be any of the 
corresponding Commission services, one with a particular record is DG Employment, Social 
Affairs and Equal Opportunities (DG EMP).  Bauer describes the European Anti-Poverty 
Network’s relationship with DG EMP as ‘lobby sponsorship’ whereby the Commission ‘starts 
creating its own constituencies with the clear intention of raising support for particular policy 
solutions and, thus, of influencing deliberations and indirectly setting political priorities’.82 A typical 
starting point for this service has been to create a conference in support of a European Year 
attached to a particular theme, from which a new interest group will emerge supported by 
Commission funding.  Groups concerned with homelessness, disability, anti-racism and migrants, 
developed following this type of course. To nurture the group to strength, the Commission service 
may designate quasi official functions to the groups, such as ‘Observatory’ status to gather and 
collect information on the state of a particular problem.  The Commission service hopes that such 
groups will become future demand agents for further European integration, both in terms of the 
development of EU competencies, and as bridges to grass roots citizens.  The EWL were a force 
behind a new Treaty clause extending equality provisions through the relationship its Spanish 
member enjoyed with its national government, and apparently helped to build popular support for 
it by taking popular roadshows around the member states83.  In this way, member states were 
presented with an irresistible demand for European integration, with the EWL playing the role very 
closely cast for groups in the development of European integration by neo-functionalist theory, 
both through the extension of competencies and building popular support in the member states.  
DG EMP’s institutionalised constituency also includes the European Trade Union Confederation 
(ETUC), with ETUCs high dependence on DG EMP for funding and to achieve its goals has led to 
one sustained cost-benefit assessment questioning the final scorecard for the Union movement,84 
despite an amusing description of DG EMP as ‘union lobby organisation, old style’85. 
 
The European Social Platform also arose from DG EMP activism, created in a joint initiative with 
the European Parliament with a direct remit to campaign for a European ‘civil dialogue’, and 
subsequently given an elevated status in funding, in the ‘Forum of Civil Society’ shadowing the 
2003-4 European Convention86, and in meetings of the informal Council of Social Affairs and 
Employment87.  The creation and funding of the European Social Platform is the most direct 
example of the ways in which the Commission sees groups as agents of input legitimacy.  In its 
1997 Communication on the role of voluntary organisations and foundations in Europe, the 
Commission argued that ‘voluntary organisations and foundations foster a sense of solidarity and 
citizenship, and provide the essential underpinnings of our democracy.  In the light of the 
challenges now facing the European Community, and indeed in the different countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe, these functions have never been more vital’88. 
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In pursuit of this outlook a new budget line (B3-4101) was created in the same year with the 
specific purpose of strengthening the capacity of ‘NGOs and other voluntary sector organisations’ 
to engage in ‘civil dialogue’ at European level.  Civil dialogue aimed at an institutionalized role for 
citizen interest organisations in EU policy making, based around confederated ‘family’ structures 
of groups such as the Social Platform in a general aspiration that these might bring aggregated, 
deliberative type legitimising inputs from civil society into EU policy making. This process did 
serve to strengthen institutional dialogue with, and the capacities of, the ‘NGO sector,’ through the 
creation of outlets such as the Social Platform. Other ‘families’ of citizen interest group structures 
either emerged, reformed, grew, and/or came to further prominence, including structures 
embracing clusters of human rights groups, environmental groups, and world development 
NGOs, and which later spawned an organisation embracing seven EU NGO families, the Contact 
Group of Civil Society.  These ‘family’ organisations of cognate groups are representative outlets 
of organised civil society, rather than organisations seeking to mobilise grass roots citizens, 
despite this latter task being part of the original remit of groups such as the Social Platform.  It is 
therefore in the interests of such groups to encourage the Commission to pursue policies which 
favour interaction with representative confederated groups as a principle, the effect of which 
would be to marginalise groups whose legitimacy is based upon their ability to articulate a cause, 
or groups encouraging direct citizen membership.  These factors are open to interpretation as 
limiting the contribution of organised civil society to input legitimacy.  
 
The European Commission’s 2001 White Paper on Governance specifically raised the prospect 
of privileged ‘extended partnership arrangements’ in return for those groups which could provide it 
with evidence of representativity.  Whilst this was quickly pronounced as unacceptable by the 
European Parliament89 on the grounds that it would restrict input by favouring certain types of 
groups whilst marginalising ‘cause’ groups, extended partnership arrangements have become 
established as de facto practice between the Commission and organised civil society, and mainly 
with ‘representative’ groups.  The institutionalisation of the Social Platform is recorded above, 
while a number of its ‘family’ cousins enjoy a similarly ingrained status in EU policy-making.  The 
longest standing of these (dating from 1974) involves the Commission’s structured co-operation 
over world development matters with CONCORD and its predecessor, representing networks of 
relief and development NGOs at international and national level90.  A heavily institutionalised 
dialogue with organised civil society is also operated by DG Trade, where registered 
organisations have created new policy initiatives following extensive deliberation in fields such as 
agriculture and access to medicines,91 and given active encouragement at Commissioner level.  
The G10 environmental family enjoys a ‘revolving door’ relationship with DG Environment such 
that one Commission official has opined that without NGO support DG Environment itself would 
not have survived.92  All of these relationships are based upon a degree of familiarity between the 
respective partners, but the most regulated and explicit use of the ‘representative’ criteria involved 
the EU social dialogue, in which the participation of organisations is tiered on the basis of their 
representativeness.  At the very top level are included representative, ‘horizontal’ organisations of 
employers and trade unions, which are empowered under the Treaties on the basis of an 
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evaluation of their degree of representativeness, to draw up EU legislation in employment related 
fields.   
 
Institutionalization seems a fate even for those groups which might otherwise be traditionally 
classed as ‘outsiders’, including a recent example surrounding claims to have inspired a high 
profile initiative launched at Commissioner level.93  The ability of such groups to quickly access 
EU decision making and get it moving highlights the essential pluralism of the system. Outsider 
activist groups highly critical of EU actions are among those which have received funding from 
EU political institutions, challenging fears that Commission funding of groups might create 
dependency relationships. Indeed, one of the purposes of funding groups is an expectation that 
they will perform the role of ‘unofficial opposition’ in a political decision-making system otherwise 
marked by consensus. A recent report notes how even ‘insider’ groups created by EU political 
institutions and overwhelmingly funded by them can deliver stinging public criticism of the 
European Commission.94  Generalised fears that Commission funding of groups might create 
dependency relationships are challenged by this example, but the example also illustrates the 
pluralistic lengths of Commission actions in the search for input legitimacy through organised civil 
society. 
 
EU Groups and Membership Dynamics 
 
In 2000 President Prodi and Vice President Kinnock presented a Commission Communication on 
‘The Commission and Non-Governmental Organisations: Building a Stronger Partnership’ which 
continued the tone of general, hopeful optimism for groups as agents of input legitimacy in 
asserting that 
 
NGOs can make a contribution fostering a more participatory democracy both within the 
EU & beyond…belonging to an association provides an opportunity for citizens to 
participate actively in new ways other than or in addition to involvement in political 
parties....organized civil society represents the views of specific groups of citizens to the 
European institutions...and contributes to the formation of a European public 
opinion...promoting European integration in a practical way and often at grass roots level 95. 
 
Any reality check would show that almost all EU groups are associations of organisations (in the 
citizen field almost entirely associations of national or other European associations), and therefore 
unable to deliver on many of the traditional strengths for interest groups in democratic systems 
rehearsed in the above citation.    EU groups are political action organisations, not service based 
organisations, because their members – often national associations, or in the corporate world 
sometimes large companies – do not need member services.  Like US Political Action 
Committees96, there are very limited ‘collective action problems’ centred on the free-riding of 
publicly available goods and the need to provide special incentives, because the members are 
already politically active organisations.  EU associations of organisations are geared towards 
meeting the political needs of their members, and therefore incentivised towards institutionalized 
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dialogue with EU institutions.  There are relatively few activities based upon the difficult task of 
mobilising members from across Europe in Brussels oriented events based activism.  Even those 
founded upon direct action, such as Greenpeace, have a Brussels policy office geared to dialogue 
with EU political institutions and other stakeholders rather than a campaign office oriented 
towards engaging in mass activism.  ‘Playing the Brussels game’ means institutionalized 
dialogue, sometimes in formal settings such as a dense network of EU advisory and consultative 
committees and expert groups97, and otherwise in more informal exchanges with EU political 
institutions and other organisational stakeholders.   
 
There is a wealth of evidence about the limited capacity of EU citizen interest groups to bridge the 
gap between themselves and citizens in the member states.   The EWL ‘roadshow’ case seems 
to be exceptional, and needs to be treated with caution as the source for the story is a 
stakeholder in the form of a previous Secretary-General.  On the basis of his empirical research 
among a sample of EU citizen interest groups which included some of the highest profile on the 
Brussels ‘NGO circuit’98, Warleigh found that  
 
necessary structures to allow NGOs an EU socialisation function, such as the existence of 
methods of internal decision making which allow supporter input into NGO EU strategy, are 
in general conspicuous by their absence.  So too are mechanisms by which NGO 
supporters or members can hold these organisations to account, or make an input into their 
decision-making.99  
 
NGOs will be unable to act as agents of civil society Europeanisation unless they are 
internally democratic and willing and able to act as agents of political socialisation, with 
particular reference to EU decision making and policy…NGOs are as yet simply not ready 
to play this role, and...it cannot be assumed that their capacity to act in this way will be 
improved...their internal governance is far too elitist to allow supporters a role in shaping 
policies, campaigns and strategies...Moreover, most NGO supporters do not actually want 
to undertake such a role’100. 
 
Warleigh’s research, findings and conclusions were replicated by Sudbery101, who, like Warleigh 
conducted interviews with a sample of EU groups which was weighted towards ‘representative’ 
rather than ‘cause’ groups.  A typical comment was that of a respondent from the Social Platform 
that ‘we do not have direct contact with supporters, but rely on member organisations to bring the 
issues to their attention’102.  A respondent from an EU environmental organisation commented 
that ‘while ideally it would be good to get people involved, time pressures mean that the most 
effective use of my time is to get on with advocacy.  In the end my role is not to encourage the 
most participatory governance, but to ensure the best results for the environment’103.   
 
These latter comments challenge those looking to groups to play the role of bridge to civil society 
constituencies, because they come from interest groups where the principal source of legitimacy 
is a claim to representativity.  But for the groups themselves these responses are a natural 
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response to incentives present in both the structure of groups, and from the EU political 
institutions, to do so.  Another of Sudbery’s respondents justified their institutional focus by 
complaining of member lack of interest or even hostility to the EU.104  This carries echoes of a 
wider debate about ‘diffuse’ versus ‘specific’ interests.  The mainstream version of this, derived 
from the work of Olson, holds that concentrated interests, such as business, are more able to 
organise than are diffuse citizen interests, resulting in asymmetries of power and the potential for 
negative externalities such as private gain at public expense through regulatory capture.105  A 
diametrically opposed version of this derives from corporatist analysis grounded in principal-agent 
theory, stressing instead the weaknesses of groups which are over controlled by their members 
or a powerful segment of them, and the autonomy of groups which are free from such domination 
because the interest constituency is too diffuse. 106  This close control by members of their trade 
association is very typical of business groups dedicated to represent a small and specialised 
constituency of large firms, where competitors work to ensure that rivals are unable to control the 
positions of associations.  At the EU level there are a significant number of highly specialised EU 
business groups with a small number of members as a result of collective action incentives to 
organise around narrow similarities.  For Streeck and Schmitter, these incentives prevail as a 
result of the diminished likelihood at EU level of an alternative source of cohesion drawn from 
corporatist style state ‘licensing’ of associations, because the EU lacks the properties of a state.  
Where there are such properties which ‘licence’ associations, the role of associations between 
states and markets is held to provide them with independence from members, whilst the 
imperative of membership facilitates member breadth.107 Some empirical challenges to the ‘no 
corporatism at the EU level’ thesis have led to the concession of ‘islands of corporatism’108, while 
observers would see in the highly institutionalised relationship between some of the Commission 
services and particular citizen interest groups something of the Lindblom thesis of neo-pluralism 
in which an activist bureaucracy seeks to purposefully empower such interests.  These have been 
significantly developed by procedural initiatives, many of which originated in the 2001 White 
Paper on Governance, which contained a set of recommendations on how to enhance democracy 
in Europe and increase the legitimacy of the institutions.109 
 
Commission Policy initiatives: the White Paper on Governance, et al 
 
Despite signs of radical experimentation in the early analyses which preceded the White Paper110, 
the final Paper offered little new by way of mechanisms to connect with citizens directly.  The 
realities of finding concrete policy initiatives drove a renewed focus in the Paper upon organised 
civil society placed in a participatory democracy model as complementary, but secondary, to 
representative democracy.  This had been supported by substantial think tank reflection by the 
Forward Studies Unit on EU democratisation on how to harness models of interest representation 
to a working model of EU democracy and to reduce its negative externalities111.  This firmly 
agenda set issues of group representativeness, accountability, and inequalities of resources.  The 
White Paper contained these agendas, drawing urgency from the fallout from the 1999 Santer 
Commission resignation in seeking to put relations with interest groups on a more open, 
transparent, and formalized footing112.  It recorded that ‘civil society organisations need to tighten 
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up their internal structures, furnish guarantees of openness and representativity, and to prove 
their capacity to relay information or lead debates in their member states’ 113, providing incentives 
for these through the prospect of extended partnership arrangements which seem to have been 
delivered by the de facto means previously outlined. 
 
The CONECCS114 database of interest groups on Europa was a resulting catalyst, making 
inclusion contingent upon the group confirming that it is formally constituted, EU wide, active, with 
expertise, and prepared to provide information about itself.  There are further compulsory 
questions about group establishment, objectives, and post-holders, and for those involved in EU 
consultative bodies, about sources of finance and details of members115.    Whilst the site makes 
clear that inclusion on the database confers no special privileges and is not to be read as an 
accreditation scheme, the incentive for groups to be included is that it is used by the various 
Commission services to identify the relevant groups with which to consult.  
 
A key point is that access to the database is only possible for groups confirming that they have 
authority to speak for their members, and which have members in at least three or more EU or 
candidate countries.  Whilst this mechanism seems to have been designed with democratic intent 
with a focus on strengthening the ability of groups to act as a bridge to member state civil society, 
it perversely seems to weaken the contribution which the totality of organised civil society might 
make to EU democratic development by favouring ‘representative’ groups over those groups 
whose legitimacy is based upon their ability to advocate a cause.   Because the constituency of 
EU citizen groups contain a mixture of both representative and cause groups, while producer 
groups are almost entirely representative in nature, the measure seems to have the opposite 
effect to that intended by the thrust of other empowering initiatives.  The problem is exacerbated 
by the incentive for representative citizen groups such as the Social Platform to preserve their 
elite status by encouraging accreditation based upon the representatative capacity of groups116.  
Most recently, another of the Commission services has raised the question as to whether funding 
should be linked to the representative capacities of groups.117   
 
Sikkink seeks a way forward between the respective polarised positions of ‘representativeness’ 
and an ‘anything goes’ ‘marketplace of ideas’ approach, shifting the emphasis to groups by 
observing that those which question the legitimacy of states may reasonably be required to 
respond to calls by states to demonstrate their own legitimacy.  The criteria she suggests include 
the need to ensure that such groups are not perceived as self-interested, building a moral 
authority through acquiring a reputation for supplying accurate information, some form of internal 
democracy, accountability and transparency, monitoring member behaviour, and standard setting 
for behaviour.  The first of these is clearly problematic, both through the author’s failure to 
articulate recognition of how the first of these would disqualify a significant constituency of groups, 
and the ways in which all types of groups have some degree of organisational prosperity as a 
built-in feature.118  Bouwen’s response on the part of producer groups is to see legitimacy as 
vested in their properties as representative organisations, and their ability to aggregate member 
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opinion to a common position, providing a useful reminder that sources of group legitimacy can 
be multifarious,119 thus requiring multiple policy instruments. 
 
Some aspects which appear to favour representative groups in Commission policy do appear in a 
series of measures adopted for use across the entire Commission as follow up measures to the 
White Paper on Governance.  These include the creation of a series of consultation standards for 
dialogue with outside interests;120 compulsory public consultation (and detailed public consultation 
plan ‘roadmaps’) for all legislative measures announced in the Commission’s forward annual 
programme of work as part of the effort to produce impact assessments for them;121 and an 
associated single access portal consultation tool.122   The consultation standards state that if 
groups do not make it apparent how inclusive their representativeness is, the Commission will 
treat their responses to individual consultations as individual submissions, and there is evidence 
of active use of this measure in implementation.123  Whilst this is qualified by a statement that 
representativeness is not the sole criteria, and a recognition that ‘minority views’ can be part of 
the ‘essential discourse’ of policies, there is a subsequent reference to ‘target groups’ which was 
the cause of alarm for both the American, and UK, governments in responding to the consultation 
exercise.124  This is an ambiguity, because the thrust of the consultation standards are to open up 
consultation to all, and to make the responses to consultation transparent.  The single access 
web portal now provides any observer with advance intention of policy initiatives and the ability to 
respond to them (and in many cases to see the responses of others), while the Commission has 
pledged itself to articulate how it responded to these consultations in the detailed design of its 
policy initiatives, a principle repeated in the Charter of Fundamental Rights where administrative 
justification for decisions is incorporated as a principle. 125  Impact assessments extend 
stakeholder consideration beyond those who respond to consultation exercises.  Whilst a legal 
basis for the consultation standards (a demand of civil society groups) has been resisted, their 
adoption is mandatory across the Commission, setting the trend towards open consultation while 
relegating elite consultation, and there are measures elsewhere which equip citizens with the 
means to enforce participation.  Thus, the EU’s signatory to the 1998 Århus Convention provides 
for access to information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice in 
environmental matters, while two subsequent directives concerning access to environmental 
information and public participation in environmental decision-making have been used by EU 
citizen interest groups in campaigning work against gene splicing technologies. An early test of 
the consultation procedures seems to have been satisfied by the Chemicals REACH126 Directive, 
where a little over 6,000 responses to its initial consultation were evenly split between producer, 
and citizen, sources.127  
 
Whilst the White Paper on Governance has been a major source of initiatives aimed at creating a 
level playing field of participation, there have been a number of complementary process 
democracy initiatives.  Key to these have been the drive to equip groups with the ability to keep 
the EU political system accountable, largely by mechanisms of transparency which enable elite 
groups to access information and place it in the public domain.  Transparency as a general 
principle has been incorporated into the Treaties through an annexed declaration which articulate 
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its contribution to the input legitimacy of political systems, based around the maintenance of 
public confidence, as a minimum condition to facilitate participation, and as a supporting measure 
of accountability.  There are routine measures to follow this up, such as public lists of advisors 
and consultative committees on Europa.  But the most striking of all are the measures for access 
to documents, supported by document registers on Europa.  These allow for the overwhelming 
majority of documents, including those originating with third parties, to be made available within 
fifteen working days of asking for them, usually available for delivery direct to an email account, 
without making any justification or even necessarily providing further details of the requestor.128  
The zeal with which this Regulation has been delivered is testified by the Commission’s 
retroactive implementation, making documents available which authors would not have known at 
the time of writing would be public.  Organised civil society has made extensive use of this 
mechanism, seeking out interesting looking listings on document registers so as to keep a check 
on other organised interests and the activities of political institutions.  Given that the effect of 
these is to ensure that issues are drawn into open public arenas where citizen groups can use 
public support to counter the asymmetries of power business groups might otherwise have in 
closed public arenas, the impact of such measures is significant.  Whilst ‘mere procedures’ can 
seem humdrum, measures such as access to documents can assist more exciting icons of 
modern politics such as public deliberation.  The provisions for a ‘Citizen’s Initiative’ in the 2004 
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe are currently being taken forward in a campaign to 
enact the measure through a Regulation129, which, if successful, is likely to further procedurally 
empower citizen interest groups as trustees of campaigns.  Curtin sees deliberative possibilities 
arising from organized civil society given a set of procedural rules to ensure their structured 
involvement in policy making and a level playing field for their participation130.  
 
Deliberative Democracy and Organized Civil Society Interests  
 
Deliberative approaches to the development of EU democratic legitimacy display mixed views as 
to whether organized interests are friend or foe.   These general approaches advocate 
development through open exchanges based on the public use of reason.  They have been 
normatively applied to the EU in outline form by Habermas131, by Joerges and Neyer in the 
context of comitology in the food sector132, by Curtin133, and in full by Eriksen and Fossum134, 
drawing upon subsequent work by Habermas135.  A sympathetic hearing is also evident in the 
work of Lord and Magnette136  and Warleigh137.  Whilst Eriksen138 sees the role of elites in EU 
policy making as an obstacle to public deliberation, a more pluralist based approach sympathetic 
to deliberation highlights the way in which ideas have become the market currency of ‘Brussels’.  
In principle, Eriksen sees the opportunities, in that Eriksen and Fossum note how ‘in the 
discourse approach it is the flow of free communication between the associational network of civil 
society and the parliamentary complex that constitutes and ensures popular sovereignty, not the 
formal aggregative procedures that the liberals place their trust in or in the coming together in fora 
and ‘halls’ that republicans salute’139. 
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These authors see the EU as more conducive to deliberation than other types of political systems 
because of the non-hierarchical nature of supranationality, and the involvement of a range of EU 
institutions.  This perspective is shared by Christiansen, Føllesdal and Piattoni, who add to it by 
reminding their readers how the lack of majoritarian mechanisms lead to negotiated policy 
outcomes140.    In a different vein, Warleigh, citing earlier work by Lambert and Hoskyns, point to 
the way in which the growing power of the European Parliament may conversely have reduced its 
deliberative capacity.  Thus, mechanisms such as conciliation have had the effect of squeezing 
out civil society interests in the search to find the grounds for consensus with the Council of 
Ministers141.  For these authors, the increasing investment of significant institutional powers in the 
European Parliament correspondingly reduces its ability to reach out to civil society.   
 
Whilst Christiansen and Piattoni see ‘the network of well informed lobbies’ as an anti-deliberative 
element through their elite nature and capacity to monopolise policy making inputs, they are seen 
as agents of deliberation where extensive consultations arise through networks, and where they 
are involved in comitology.  Among the deliberative elements are a series of issues presented for 
democratic participation by the complex and opaque world of EU Committees and expert groups 
in policy making and implementation.  The total number of these has been estimated at between 
1000142 to 1500 in number143, of which around 700 are estimated to be engaged in the process of 
policy formulation, divided between advisory groups, expert groups, and scientific committees.  Of 
these, organized civil society interests play a formal role on advisory committees which contribute 
to policy formulation.  The wider spectrum of committees have routinely attracted concerns about 
opacity and scope for privatisation of policy making, once again prompting the use of procedures 
to support democratic norms.  Thus, in the post White Paper on Governance environment a 
Commission Communication on the Collection and Use of Expertise144 sought to minimise the 
risk of vested interests distorting advice, and required public justification of opinion and the 
placing of uncertainties and divergent opinion in the public domain.  The initiative led to web 
based registers of Expert Groups145 and Consultative bodies146 of the Commission.  Beyond 
procedural measures, Joerges and Neyer have seen them as potential agents of democratic 
legitimation as a forum of deliberative politics,147 finding evidence from a study of food 
committees that the perspectives of differing interests and a wide variety of stakeholders are 
taken into account in a manner resembling deliberative processes.  Joerges cites the incredulity 
of Kohler-Koch: ‘none other than comitology, that notorious system of inter-bureaucratic 
negotiation-diplomacy that even parliamentarians wish to abolish in the interest of democracy, is 
supposed to bring an element of democratically-legitimated politics into the Community’148. 
 
In such committees in the foodstuffs domain Joerges sees a high level of debate contributing to a 
high level of European protective standards: ‘by virtue of its feedback links to Member States, 
comitology can, in principle, take all social concerns and interests into account while, at the same 
time, links with science (seen as a social body) can be shaped so as to allow for the plurality of 
scientific knowledge to be brought to bear’149.  Joerges draws attention to the way in which the 
Scientific Committee on Food publishes its opinions and exposes them to wider public debate, 
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and uses the internet to disseminate its findings, reflecting that ‘the potential of this form of 
publication in terms of participatory democracy cannot be overestimated’150. 
 
It is easiest to see deliberative mechanisms operating through policy networks, whether tightly 
based around policy making in with shared ideas become the key currency, or loosely based 
around exchanges between opposing ‘camps’, where iterative exchanges over time result in 
some common ground.  These concepts resonate with those used in the wider literature on 
sociological institutionalism, where belief systems arising from socialisation effects of institutional 
participation help explain the behaviour of actors151.  Börzel152, and Skogstad, are among those to 
assess the extent to which EU networks are friend or foe of input based legitimacy, concluding 
that characteristics of networks result in variation concerned with their degree of 
institutionalisation.153 The factors of variation involve the composition of groups and the degree of 
their inclusiveness, and where such networks are highly inclusive and pluralistic, so they can be 
agents of input legitimacy. 
 
A number of authors have also assessed the presence and extent of deliberation by organized 
civil society interests in the context of the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) inclusion agenda 
in support of the wider Lisbon process, and have seen in it a grass roots procedure of public 
deliberation among stakeholders154.  Clause 38 of the Lisbon European Council 2000 declaration 
launching the process states that ‘the social partners and civil society will be involved using 
various forms of partnership’. Objective 4 of the OMC inclusion process is to ‘mobilize all relevant 
actors,’ both as an end in itself and as a means to achieve wider goals such as deliberative style 
best practice learning.  Whilst there is a mixed record of drawing groups in to Lisbon goals, a 
2002 survey undertaken by the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working 
Conditions found a direct contribution of social partners in writing National Action Plans in 7 of 
EU-15 countries, and high satisfaction about participatory conditions in 6 countries155. This is a 
similar view to the one taken by the Council at the time of its inception as ‘an important tool to 
improve transparency and democratic participation’156.  On the basis of two case studies, de la 
Porte and Nanz (2004) take a guarded assessment from the results obtained so far from OMC, 
finding some wider development but relatively little evidence of anything resembling deliberative 
outcomes or practice.157  
 
Conclusion 
 
Sudbery records comment from members of the Commission team working on the Governance 
White Paper which reveal their core doubts about the feasibility of moving beyond output 
legitimacy to search for input legitimacy.  One member of the team told her ‘perhaps the most 
effective way to link with the citizen is by more effective results’158, and, more startlingly, that ‘the 
issue about bringing in the citizen is for speeches, for the rhetoric.  This organisation will never 
touch the citizen directly’159.  With one eye to output legitimacy and such doubts about direct 
inputs there will always be a focus upon elite, often confederated, groups, particularly within a 
system leaving such a strong trail of incentives for institutional participation whilst disincentivising 
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mass mobilisation. Nonetheless, there are clear signs of development.  Lord and Magnette argue 
that the EU 
 
is arguably precocious in new forms of governance which may have their own 
representative qualities.  It often bargains solutions in networks that are inclusive of a wide 
variety of actors, deliberates them in settings where scientific and normative opinion 
assumptions have to be defended, and uses decision-rules to make it hard even for 
oversized majorities to capture the benefits of co-operation for themselves, rather than 
distribute them more evenly160. 
 
These attempts to harness, and adapt, participatory mechanisms with representative traditions 
seems to map a pathway of development by addressing some of the negative externalities long 
associated with the contribution of organized civil society to input legitimacy.  The EU model of 
participatory democracy centred on organised civil society matches very closely the neo-pluralist 
typecast of Lindblom, in which an activist bureaucracy works directly to address asymmetries of 
power between different constituencies of civil society, actively intervening to empower citizen 
interest groups to act as checks and balances viz. each other and political institutions.  Among the 
most striking of these are issues surrounding the institutionalisation of groups, including 
measures to stimulate citizen group formation and maintenance such as the substantial funding 
of citizen groups, and the bureaucratic accommodation of them in the corresponding Commission 
services.  The institutionalisation of outsider groups with a hostile message complaining of 
exclusion to the point that they are able to drive policy initiatives seems only to provide ironic 
evidence of the essential pluralism of the system, and of the ways in which institutionalism can 
address asymmetries of power.  
 
There are concrete achievements of process democracy in addressing asymmetries of power, 
and of particular note is the vigour of these.  They include procedures to: consult on all legislative 
initiatives announced in advance in an annual forward programme; ensure open consultations; 
making transparent the basis of policy choice; impact assessments which assess the effect of 
measures upon every kind of stakeholder; a transparent basis for the use of expertise throughout; 
and transparency measures which support the ability of groups to keep the political system 
accountable, and to enact various of mechanisms of checks and balances.  Equally significant in 
this latter endeavour are the design features of a multi-level governance system reviewed herein 
as highlighted by Grande, in which the fragmentation of power between political institutions and 
actors prevent any one type of interest from routinely dominating by creating a natural system of 
checks and balances and facilitating access for all.  Together with collective action logics these 
seem to contribute to levelling the playing field.  Of note here is a landscape of competition 
among business interests, but in particular the apparent triumph of corporatist over Olsonian 
logic, where a combination of the fragmentation of power in a multi-level governance system, and 
the confederate nature of groups, means that specific interests have the disadvantage of 
restriction, and diffuse interests the advantage of autonomy.  Whilst the issues surrounding the 
contribution of organised civil society to democratic legitimacy and the neo-pluralist role of political 
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institutions to this end have a familiar ring about them to those of developed democracies, at the 
EU level there are striking features which seem to make a difference.  These derive from features 
of the transnational level itself and its impact upon group design and internal characteristics of 
power dynamics and operation, the extreme diffusion of power in a multi-level governance 
system, the vigour of procedural measures and the degree of bureaucratic activism.  Of the three 
broad approaches to the role of organised civil society in EU democratic legitimacy outlined 
herein, all of these features lend themselves to the optimistic outlook, with reservations as to the 
apparently clumsy privileging of ‘representative’ groups over other types.  To the observer familiar 
with the role of groups in democratic systems, the degree of institutionalisation of groups in the 
EU system and all its manifestations and consequences, without necessarily weakening their role 
in input legitimacy, is striking. 
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